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Derailing FELA’s Causation Standard: The 
Supreme Court’s Misinterpretation of FELA in 
McBride and Suggestions to Restrict the Potential 
for Unlimited Carrier Liability* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Both economically and socially, railroads are an integral part of 
modern America.  From the earliest days of rail development in the 
Northeast1 and the connection of the first transcontinental rail route at 
Promontory Summit, Utah,2 to Amtrak3 and modern freight 
transportation, railroads have captured the American imagination4 and 
played a vital role in economic development.5  As with many inventions 
associated with the Industrial Revolution, the development of America’s 
railroad system took an enormous toll on railroad employees and their 
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 1.  For an anecdotal description of one of America’s earliest railroads in the Northeast portion 
of the country, see generally HERBERT H. HARWOOD, JR., IMPOSSIBLE CHALLENGE: THE 
BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD IN MARYLAND (1979). 
 2.  For a discussion of the completion of the First Transcontinental Railroad, see generally 
DAVID HAWARD BAIN, EMPIRE EXPRESS: BUILDING THE FIRST TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD 
645–72 (1999).  
 3.  See generally Jeffrey J. Amato, Comment, The MTA, It’s Not “Going Your Way”—
Liability of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Under FELA: Greene v. Long Island R.R., 75 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 113, 125–35 (2001) (discussing the Amtrak and the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority’s liability under FELA). 
 4.  See, e.g., REV. W. AWDRY, THOMAS THE TANK ENGINE: THE COMPLETE COLLECTION 
(Random House Value Publ’g 1997) (1996) (compilation of stories featuring popular children’s 
book character and train “Thomas the Tank Engine”); MAURY KLEIN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE 
RAILROAD IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (collecting articles discussing the importance of the railroad 
industry in American life); WATTY PIPER, THE LITTLE ENGINE THAT COULD (1978) (world-famous 
American children’s book using a fictional train to express the importance of positive thinking and 
perseverance); AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957) (perennial best-selling American novel that 
centers on the social and economic importance of the railroad industry).  
 5.  See Leland H. Jenks, Railroads as an Economic Force in American Development, 4 J. 
ECON. HIST. 1, 10–20 (1944) (discussing railroads’ impact on economic development in America). 
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families in terms of injuries, disabilities, and deaths.6  Dismayed by the 
frequency and severity of injuries railroad employees suffered,7 Congress 
passed the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA)8 in 1908.9  FELA’s 
purpose was to compensate railroad employees who were injured as a 
result of carrier negligence.10  By providing a federal statutory tort that 
relaxed many of the common law restrictions on recovery for carrier 
negligence,11 Congress sought to encourage the railroad industry to 
improve employee safety by exposing carriers to greater risk of 
liability.12  With a few congressional tweaks,13 FELA has remained the 
statutory mechanism by which employees injured by carrier negligence 
have asserted claims for damages since 1908.14 
In perhaps the most consequential FELA case in the statute’s history, 
the United States Supreme Court recently addressed an element under the 
statute that has long caused confusion.15  In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. 
McBride, the Court ruled that FELA does not incorporate proximate 
cause requirements that exist in nonstatutory tort actions.16  Relying on 
the statute’s ambiguous causation language and the fifty-four-year-old 
case Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.,17 the majority decided that 
employees injured by railroad negligence may recover damages if carrier 
negligence played “any part”—no matter how small or remote—in 
bringing about the injury.18  In so doing, the Court concluded that juries 
                                                          
 6.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 223 (3d ed. 2005). 
 7.  William P. Murphy, Sidetracking the FELA: The Railroads’ Property Damage Claims, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 355 (1985).  
 8.  45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2006).   
 9.  Federal Employers Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908). 
 10.  Murphy, supra note 7, at 355. 
 11.  See Amato, supra note 3, at 117 (discussing common law defenses eliminated by FELA). 
 12.  See Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930) (stating that FELA was “intended to 
stimulate carriers to greater diligence for safety”), superseded by statute, Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1639 (1984), as 
stated in McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 349 (1991); see also Mondou v. N.Y., 
New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. (Second Employers’ Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 50–51 (1912).  
 13.  See Murphy, supra note 7, at 361–64 (discussing congressional amendments to FELA in 
1910 and 1939).  
 14.  See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2006) (providing the statutory framework for FELA’s federal tort 
regime); see also Murphy, supra note 7, at 358. 
 15.  See Melissa Sandoval Greenidge, Comment, Getting the Train on the Right Track: A 
Modern Proposal for Changes to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 407, 
414–18 (2010) (discussing the confusion and difficulty courts have faced in applying a consistent 
causation standard in FELA cases). 
 16.  131 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (2011). 
 17.  352 U.S. 500 (1957). 
 18.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2634. 
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should not be instructed to consider questions encompassing the concept 
of proximate cause.19  Absent such instruction, juries must decide cases 
without considering whether the injury was within the scope of the risk 
created by the carrier’s negligence; whether the injury was a natural, 
probable, or foreseeable outcome of the negligence; or whether a 
superseding or intervening cause led to the employee’s injury.20  The 
Court’s 5-4 decision in McBride is an erroneous interpretation of FELA’s 
causation standard, as modified by Rogers, for claims involving carrier 
negligence.  And although the dissent was more faithful to FELA’s text 
and history by incorporating a proximate causation standard of some 
kind, it failed to provide an alternate causation standard. 
Part II of this Note begins by examining railroads and railroad-
related accidents before Congress enacted FELA.  This section focuses 
on the state-by-state common law tort system’s failure to adequately 
protect carrier employees from negligence and the dangerous conditions 
caused by these speeding “iron horses.”  Next, Part II explores FELA’s 
passage as a response to this problem.  It examines the views held by the 
politicians who enacted the statute and early court cases interpreting its 
provisions.  Part II also discusses the Supreme Court’s Rogers decision 
and subsequent FELA cases, which laid the groundwork for eliminating 
a proximate cause element in FELA actions.21 
Finally, Part II examines the accident that gave rise to McBride.  It 
describes the facts surrounding the plaintiff Robert McBride’s injuries, 
the trial where the disputed jury instruction withholding a proximate 
cause instruction was given, and the subsequent appeals by CSX 
Transportation, Inc. (CSX).  Part II concludes by examining the 
arguments of the litigants and the positions advocated in amici briefs 
submitted to the Supreme Court.  It includes questions the Justices posed 
to counsel at oral argument, which shed a great deal of light on the 
individual Justices’ initial inclinations. 
Part III of this Note analyzes the outcome in McBride and the 
rationale of the majority and dissenting opinions.  Next, it argues that the 
Court’s erroneous conclusion that proximate cause is irrelevant in FELA 
decisions threatens to expose railroads to unlimited liability under a “but 
for” causation standard.  Part III proposes a flexible causation standard 
                                                          
 19.  See id. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See id. at 2634 (majority opinion) (stating that the holding was “[i]n accord with . . . this 
Court’s decision in [Rogers]”). 
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that will require plaintiffs to prove proximate cause, while allowing a 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach to defining the stringency with 
which courts should analyze proximate cause.  Finally, this Note calls on 
Congress to amend FELA to include this workable causation standard—
which is similar to the one that was used under FELA for most of its 
existence—that will appropriately restrict carrier liability while 
maintaining the statute’s remedial goals and “humanitarian purposes.”22 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Railroad Liability in Tort Before FELA 
Before the passage of FELA, rail workers were exposed to enormous 
hazards in the workplace from which the prevailing common law tort 
system provided little protection.23  During an address in 1889, President 
Benjamin Harrison reminded Congress of the astonishing threat of injury 
that rail workers in the late Nineteenth Century faced.24  In calling for 
protective federal legislation, President Harrison chastised Congress that 
“[i]t is a reproach to our  civilization that any class of American 
workmen should, in the pursuit of a necessary and useful vocation, be 
subjected to a peril of life and limb as great as that of a soldier in time of 
war.”25  President Harrison was not merely hyperbolizing to push for 
desired legislation.  One year before Harrison’s address, “the odds 
against a railroad brakeman’s dying a natural death were almost four to 
one.”26  According to the Interstate Commerce Commission, 2,660 
railway employees were killed and 26,140 railway employees injured 
during a one-year period in the early 1890s.27 
Despite these well-known hazards, the state common law system was 
surprisingly nonresponsive to employee tort claims for employer 
negligence.28  In many cases, employees who suffered severe injuries or 
                                                          
 22.  Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994). 
 23.  See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 179 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(citing Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 542; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., 
concurring)) (noting Congress’s dissatisfaction with the common law tort system’s response to rail 
accidents prior to FELA). 
 24.  See Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 19 (1904). 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). 
 27.  Johnson, 196 U.S. at 19. 
 28.  See Murphy, supra note 7, at 356 (“Congress enacted the Federal Employer’s Liability Act 
‘to give relief against the rigors of the common law.’” (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 4608 (1905) 
(statement of Rep. Flood))).   
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even death faced unsympathetic judges who dismissed their claims 
before trial, directed verdicts in favor of the defendant railroads, or 
overturned judgments in the plaintiffs’ favor on appeal.29  Additionally, 
many strict common law rules regarding plaintiffs’ contributory 
negligence, their alleged assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule 
often operated to bar recovery by an injured worker.30  In 1908, the year 
Congress passed FELA, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor 
recognized that the state-by-state common law approach placed a 
disproportionate share of the burden for railroad accidents on the backs 
of railroad laborers.31  This inequitable situation led many in Congress 
and the federal government to echo President Harrison’s call for a federal 
compensatory scheme that would help ensure workers injured by railroad 
negligence received adequate compensation.32 
B. FELA and Early FELA Cases 
Congress passed FELA in 1908.33  Although the 1908 law and its 
subsequent amendments are still largely the provisions that govern 
railroad negligence today, the 1908 statute was not Congress’s first 
attempt to expand carrier liability with a federal tort.34  The precursor to 
FELA was passed in 1906, and it contained many of the provisions 
eventually incorporated into FELA.35  Although the interstate nature of 
railroads appear to make them the quintessential target of regulation 
under Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,36 the Supreme Court in 
Howard v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. effectively gutted the 1906 
statute, ruling that it impermissibly infringed on purely intrastate 
activities.37  Dicta in Howard, however, suggested that with some 
                                                          
 29.  See, e.g., Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 117 F. 462, 472 (8th Cir. 1902) (affirming directed verdict 
in personal injury tort claim), rev’d, 196 U.S. 1 (1904); Boland v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 96 Ala. 
626, 632–35 (1892) (affirming judgment for defendant railroad after trial judge refused to instruct 
the jury regarding the railroad’s knowledge that plaintiff was unfamiliar with the employment task 
assigned); Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Smithson, 7 N.W. 791, 795 (Mich. 1881) (reversing jury verdict in 
favor of injured plaintiff).  
 30.  See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1994). 
 31.  S. REP. NO. 60-460, at 1–3 (1908). 
 32.  See Murphy, supra note 7, at 359. 
 33.  Federal Employers Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908). 
 34.  For a discussion of FELA’s predecessor, passed in 1906, see generally Murphy, supra note 
7, at 355–58. 
 35.  See id. 
 36.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 37.  207 U.S. 463, 502–04 (1908).  
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changes, the Court would be willing to acquiesce in a federal tort scheme 
to regulate railroad employee safety.38  Acting on this invitation and with 
the encouragement of progressive Republican President Theodore 
Roosevelt, Congress enacted FELA the same year as the Howard 
decision, invalidating the prior law.39  FELA built on Congress’s earlier 
attempt to abrogate the most defense-friendly rules that had developed in 
the common law regarding employer negligence.40  In addition to the 
provisions that expressly abrogate otherwise applicable common law 
doctrines, FELA provides that: 
Every common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages 
to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such 
carrier . . . or, in case of the death of such employee, to his . . . 
personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving 
widow . . . and children of such employee . . . for such injury or 
death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of 
the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier . . . .41 
With this broad standard of causation, Congress greatly improved 
injured rail workers’ chances of recovering for negligence-related 
injuries suffered in the workplace.  In the words of Justice William O. 
Douglas, Congress “designed [FELA] to put on the railroad industry 
some of the cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in 
its operations.”42  Although it is clear Congress sought to put an 
increased burden on the railroads for injuries that occurred as a result of 
railroad negligence, it is not clear from early cases and contemporary 
statements that FELA abrogated the requirement of proximate cause 
between the negligence and harm. 
State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims 
under FELA,43 but its substance is solely a matter of federal law.44  
Accordingly, FELA preempts state law tort claims for rail carrier 
                                                          
 38.  See id. at 504 (conceding that the statute “embraces [some] subjects within the authority of 
Congress to regulate commerce”). 
 39.  Murphy, supra note 7, at 359 (quoting 42 CONG. REC. 1347 (1908) (special message of 
President Theodore Roosevelt)). 
 40.  See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2646 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); see also Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 168 (2007); Consol. Rail Corp. v. 
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1994). 
 41.  45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006). 
 42.  Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 43.  45 U.S.C. § 56. 
 44.  Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 165. 
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negligence.45  In contrast to no-fault damages statutes, such as workers’ 
compensation, FELA is a negligence statute.46  As the statutory language 
indicates, recovery is premised on the “negligence of . . . such carrier.”47  
The majority of early cases under FELA required that the plaintiff satisfy 
a proximate causation standard.48  In fact, the Supreme Court applied a 
proximate causation standard in more than fifteen FELA cases before 
Rogers.49  Two FELA cases to reach the Supreme Court following its 
passage—Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Earnest50 and St. Louis, 
Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. McWhirter51—explicitly applied a 
proximate causation standard.52  And Congress was apparently 
unconcerned that courts were applying proximate cause in FELA cases.  
Despite passing significant amendments to the statute in 191053 and 
1939,54 Congress declined to change the causation language used in the 
initial law.55 
Following the 1939 amendments, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
interpretation of causation under FELA as including a proximate cause 
element.56  In Brady v. Southern Railway Co., the Supreme Court 
affirmed a North Carolina decision denying recovery for failure to satisfy 
proximate cause.57  Although Brady was decided by a 5-4 vote, the 
dissent also recognized that proximate cause was “the meaning Congress 
                                                          
 45.  Id.   
 46.  See 45 U.S.C. § 51. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 173–74 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]hroughout the half-century 
between FELA’s enactment and the decision in Rogers, we consistently recognized and applied 
proximate cause as the proper standard in FELA suits.”). 
 49.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011) 
(No. 10-235), 2010 WL 3267817, at *17. 
 50.  229 U.S. 114 (1913). 
 51.  229 U.S. 265 (1913). 
 52.  Earnest, 229 U.S. at 118–19 (finding that the jury was correctly instructed that, if the 
engineers’ failure to warn “was the proximate cause of the accident, then [you] must find for the 
plaintiff”); McWhirter, 229 U.S. at 280 (holding “it must be shown” that the alleged negligent act 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries). 
 53.  Federal Employers Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 61-117, 36 Stat. 291 (1910) (codified at 45 
U.S.C. § 56 (2006)).  
 54.  Federal Employers Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 76-382, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939) (codified at 45 
U.S.C. § 54 (2006)). 
 55.  See Murphy, supra note 7, at 361–64 (describing the 1910 and 1939 amendments to FELA, 
which did not alter the causation standard). 
 56.  See Brady v. S. Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 484 (1943), abrogated by CSX Transp., Inc., v. 
McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011). 
 57.  See id. at 484 (“The carrier’s negligence must be a link in an unbroken chain of reasonably 
foreseeable events.”).  
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intended when it made railroads liable for the injury or death of an 
employee ‘due to’ or ‘resulting in whole or in part from’ the railroad’s 
negligence.”58  The Court later, in 1949, confirmed the apparently 
unquestioned and uncontroversial position that proximate cause was a 
mandatory element in FELA claims.59  In both federal and state cases 
under FELA before Rogers, not only was proximate cause an element of 
the claims, but any argument to the contrary apparently received very 
little or no attention.  In Rogers, however, the Court’s decision shed 
considerable doubt on the Court’s understanding of FELA’s causation 
language. 
C. Rogers and Subsequent FELA Cases 
1. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. 
In July 1951, James Rogers was employed as a laborer by the 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company.60  While working alongside a 
double-track line that Missouri Pacific owned, Rogers’s foreman 
assigned him the duty of burning off weeds and vegetation beside the 
track.61  Rogers was given a “crude hand torch” and instructed to burn 
vegetation growing on a steep incline that sloped up away from the 
double-track line.62  The foreman additionally instructed Rogers to stop 
burning the vegetation when a train approached on the line and visually 
inspect the train’s journals, or bearings, for “hotboxes.”63  When Rogers 
heard the whistle of an approaching train, he retreated from the line as 
instructed.64  The passing train, however, fanned some remaining flames, 
which quickly spread and enveloped the area surrounding Rogers.65  
Rogers attempted to flee the dangerous area, but while running along the 
steep embankment and through thick smoke, he slipped on loose gravel 
covering the slope.66  The subsequent fall caused Rogers personal 
injuries, for which he sued Missouri Pacific under FELA in the St. Louis 
                                                          
 58.  Id. at 489 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 59.  See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 177 (1949). 
 60.  Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 501 (1957).  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 502. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 502–03. 
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Circuit Court.67  After a jury returned a verdict in Rogers’s favor and 
awarded him $40,000 in damages, Missouri Pacific appealed to the 
Missouri Supreme Court.68 
Rogers argued at trial that his injury was caused by Missouri 
Pacific’s failure to exercise ordinary care in instructing him to burn so 
close to the rail line.69  Rogers further alleged that the burning method 
was unreasonably dangerous.70  Although the jury found that Missouri 
Pacific was negligent and awarded Rogers damages, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri reversed for lack of evidence to support the jury’s liability 
finding.71  The Missouri Supreme Court—again applying a form of 
proximate cause—held that “the fire . . . was something extraordinary, 
unrelated to, and disconnected from the incline of the gravel at the 
culvert.”72  Consequently, a unanimous court reversed the jury’s award.73  
Rogers appealed the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision to the United 
States Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether the reversal invaded the jury’s proper function under FELA.74 
The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the Missouri Supreme Court had 
improperly reversed the jury’s finding of actionable negligence by 
Missouri Pacific.75  Although welcome news for Rogers, the decision 
cast doubt on the previously settled question of FELA’s caused “in 
whole or in part” language.  Justice William Brennan’s opinion in Rogers 
injected considerable uncertainty into analyzing claims under FELA.  
The Court concluded that the Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion was 
susceptible to “two potential readings” but under either understanding it 
was incorrect to set aside the jury’s verdict.76  The Court first rejected the 
Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling that Rogers’s actions were as a matter 
of law “the sole cause of his mishap.”77  Next, and more importantly for 
the future understanding of the causation requirement under FELA, the 
Court concluded that the employer’s negligence need not be a more-
                                                          
 67.  Rogers v. Thompson, 284 S.W.2d 467, 467–68 (Mo. 1955), rev’d by 352 U.S. 500 (1957). 
 68.  Id. at 468. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Rogers, 352 U.S. at 501. 
 72.  Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 472. 
 73.  Id. at 472–73. 
 74.  Rogers, 352 U.S. at 501. 
 75.  See id. at 510–11. 
 76.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2648 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 77.  Rogers, 352 U.S. at 504. 
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probable cause of Rogers’s injuries than his own actions.78  Accordingly, 
the Court held that the Missouri Supreme Court erred in reversing the 
jury verdict and reversed and remanded for proceedings in accord with 
the opinion.79 
In concluding that it was irrelevant whether the employer or 
employee’s actions were the more-probable cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries, the Court failed to specify whether it was addressing solely the 
statutory contributory fault provision in FELA or fundamental 
understandings of proximate cause.  Consequently, the Court’s language 
that the only question for the jury was whether “employer negligence 
played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury”80 led many 
courts to effectively conclude that proximate cause was no longer a 
requirement under FELA.81  Moreover, many courts that still recognized 
a proximate causation standard of sorts diluted its requirements to such a 
degree that there was substantively no proximate cause—as it is known 
under common law standards—required in FELA cases.82  Despite this 
widespread interpretation of Rogers, numerous courts and several 
Supreme Court justices still believed that Rogers did not alter FELA’s 
proximate cause requirement.83  Accordingly, confusion regarding the 
causation standard required for recovery under FELA permeated 
decisions under the statute following Rogers. 
2. Supreme Court Cases Struggling to Apply FELA Post-Rogers 
Although McBride was the first landmark decision interpreting 
FELA since Rogers,84 several cases reached the Court in the interim and 
                                                          
 78.  See McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2638; Rogers, 352 U.S. at 505–06. 
 79.  Rogers, 352 U.S. at 511. 
 80.  Id. at 506. 
 81.  See, e.g., Summers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599, 606 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court definitely abandoned [the proximate cause] approach in [Rogers] . . . .”); Oglesby v. 
S. Pac. Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding and noting agreement in other courts 
that proximate cause is no longer required in FELA actions). 
 82.  See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sellan, 231 F.3d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating under 
FELA that employer will be liable if negligence “played any part” in the injury); Ulfik v. Metro-N. 
Commuter R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 58 (2nd Cir. 1996) (stating that a “relaxed standard of proof” applies to 
causation in FELA cases); Moody v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 823 F.2d 693, 695–96 (1st Cir. 1987) (“We 
recognize the considerably relaxed standard of proof in FELA cases.”).  
 83.  See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 172–76 (2007) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(“The absence of any intent to water down the common law requirement of proximate cause is 
evident from the cases on which Rogers relied.”). 
 84.  Victor E. Schwartz, The Supreme Court Meets Civil Justice Issues: A Most Unusual Term, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/the-supreme-
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demonstrated the confusion wrought by the Rogers decision.85  Rogers 
was an important element in the Court’s decision in McBride, and the 
Court’s inability to successfully apply FELA after Rogers is indicative of 
the decision’s analytical problems.  Moreover, several FELA decisions 
between Rogers and McBride demonstrated the problems inherent in 
Rogers’s confusion-inducing standard.  Most prominent among these 
confused decisions are Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall86 and 
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell.87 
a. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall 
The Court granted certiorari in Gottshall to determine whether a 
claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress was cognizable 
under FELA.88  Accordingly, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion did not 
directly address the proximate causation standard articulated in Rogers.89  
The dispute in Gottshall centered on the general issue of the extent to 
which common law principles remained applicable under the statutory 
tort regime FELA created.90  Because proximate causation is a hallmark 
of the common law tort system,91 the interpretation of common law 
standards in Gottshall shed considerable light on the importance of such 
principles under FELA.  The Gottshall Court held that “although 
common-law principles are not necessarily dispositive of questions 
arising under FELA, unless they are expressly rejected in the text of the 
statute, they are entitled to great weight in our analysis.”92  Emphasizing 
the common law’s importance, the Court concluded that an employee 
could maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
                                                                                                                       
 
court-meets-civil-justice-issues-a-most-unusual-term. 
 85.  See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542–44 (1994) (noting that the 
Rogers Court found a relaxed standard for causation). 
 86.  512 U.S. 532 (1994). 
 87.  549 U.S. 158 (2007). 
 88.  Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 535. 
 89.  See id. at 543 (discussing but not scrutinizing the “relaxed standard of causation” 
articulated in Rogers). 
 90.  See id. at 543–44 (stating FELA is founded on common law concepts of negligence but 
subject to congressional qualifications). 
 91.  See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2645 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Recovery for negligence has always required a showing of proximate cause.”). 
 92.  Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 544. 
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under FELA and that the “zone of danger” test was the appropriate 
standard for that particular injury.93 
Even though it did not rely on Rogers’s holding in Gottshall, the 
Court emphasized the unworkable nature of foreseeability as a test for 
liability under FELA.94  Concurring, Justice Souter wrote separately to 
“make explicit . . . the Court’s duty . . . in interpreting FELA.”95  Justice 
Souter argued that this duty was to “develop a federal common law of 
negligence under FELA, informed by reference to the evolving common 
law.”96  Justice Souter ultimately concluded that the Court met its 
obligation, and he joined the majority opinion.97  In her dissent, however, 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court required an overly restrictive 
standard by imposing the “zone of danger” test.98  The defects in 
Rogers’s standard and the dicta used therein are particularly noticeable in 
Ginsburg’s dissent.  Justice Ginsburg relied on the remedial nature of 
FELA and the conclusion that “FELA was designed to provide a federal 
‘statutory negligence action . . . significantly different from the ordinary 
common-law negligence action.’”99  Her dissent, joined by Justices 
Stevens and Blackmun, concluded that the correct common law test was 
not as easily discernible as the Court concluded.100  The three dissenting 
Justices would have allowed the lower courts to develop a more liberal 
standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.101 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Gottshall indicated her inclination to 
scuttle common law rules in favor of broad, sweeping protection for 
injured rail workers.  Her conclusion that requiring consistency with the 
common law was “odd” foretold her desire to expand FELA protection 
regardless of what common law principles generally applied in 1908.102  
                                                          
 93.  See id. at 557 (“[W]e conclude that the policy considerations of the common law as they 
are embodied in the zone of danger test best accord with the concerns that have motivated our FELA 
jurisprudence.”). 
 94.  See id. at 553–55 (discussing the foreseeability of the worker’s injury to the defendant rail 
company).  
 95.  Id. at 558 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id. at 559. 
 98.  See id. at 559–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 99.  Id. at 560 (alteration in original) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 509–
10 (1957)). 
 100.  See id. at 571–72 (criticizing the majority’s rejection of the approach “thoughtfully 
developed and comprehensively explained” by the lower court). 
 101.  See id. at 572 (noting that the zone of danger test “leaves severely harmed workers 
remediless”). 
 102.  See id. at 571. 
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Although the majority of the Court agreed that the common law required 
the “zone of danger” test, Justice Ginsburg rejected a strict application of 
a singular common law, noting that “[t]he common law is not a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky.”103  The dissent in Gottshall illustrated the 
Court’s lack of uniformity regarding the extent to which common law 
principles remained applicable in FELA cases after Rogers.  Several 
years after Gottshall, the issue of the continuing applicability of common 
law principles in FELA cases reemerged in Sorrell.104 
b. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell 
In Sorrell, the Court confronted the question of whether a different 
proximate causation standard should apply in FELA cases involving a 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence.105  The Court unanimously rejected 
the lower court’s application of a different causation standard for claims 
involving contributory negligence.106  Despite the unanimity in the 
outcome, the Court again split sharply in rationale.107  In fact, Sorrell is 
most important for Justices Ginsburg and Souter’s concurring opinions 
that debated the proximate causation standard in FELA cases as modified 
by Rogers.108  Justice Ginsburg concurred only in the outcome of the 
case and filed a concurring opinion emphasizing that the Court’s holding 
was only relevant to the narrow issue that garnered a majority.109  Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence was obviously directed at Justice Souter’s 
concurrence—joined by Justices Scalia and Alito—that argued Rogers 
“did not address, much less alter, existing law governing the degree of 
causation necessary for redressing negligence.”110  Justice Souter’s 
concurrence specifically criticized the attempts by some courts to read 
Rogers as “smuggl[ing] proximate cause out of . . . FELA.”111  True to 
his reputation as a judicial minimalist,112 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
                                                          
 103.  Id. at 571 n.4 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104.  See 549 U.S. 158, 160 (2007). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 159. 
 107.  Compare id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring), with id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 108.  See id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Rogers did not intend to “water down” 
the proximate cause requirement); id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting the “relaxed” 
causation standard for FELA cases). 
 109.  See id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 110.  Id. at 173 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 111.  Id. at 173 n.*. 
 112.  See generally David Von Drehle, The Incredibly Shrinking Court, TIME (Oct. 11, 2007), 
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opinion did not reach the question of Rogers’s ultimate impact on the 
proximate causation standard under FELA.113  The battling concurrences 
of Justices Souter and Ginsburg, however, were clearly meant to shape 
the debate for a future case determining the extent to which Rogers 
changed the proximate cause requirement in FELA. 
After admonishing the lower courts for reading Rogers too broadly, 
Justice Souter emphasized the continued applicability of common law 
principles—including proximate cause—in federal tort cases.114  The 
concurrence continued by acknowledging the difficulty caused by 
Rogers’s oblique dicta that seemed to suggest that the proximate cause 
requirement had been lowered or abolished.115  Specifically, Justice 
Souter noted that “the statement in Rogers that a case must go to a jury 
where ‘the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer 
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or 
death for which damages are sought’” caused courts great difficulty 
when grappling with the degree of causation required post-Rogers.116  
Instead of reading this language as a broad statement regarding causation 
under FELA, Justice Souter’s concurrence sought to cabin its 
applicability to cases of contributory negligence—the issue before the 
Court in Rogers.117 
While Justice Souter advocated limiting Rogers, Justice Ginsburg 
wrote separately to emphasize that Sorrell did not reach that issue.118  
She emphasized that the Court’s Sorrell opinion did nothing to alter the 
“relaxed causation” standard announced in Rogers.119  Because she was 
concurring in the judgment alone, Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly 
announce her view on the issue of proximate cause under FELA, but in 
retrospect, it appears from her positions in Gottshall and Sorrell that she 
believed common law conceptions of proximate cause were no longer 
                                                                                                                       
 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1670489,00.html (discussing Chief Justice John 
Roberts’s reputation for deciding cases on the narrowest permissible grounds). 
 113.  Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 171–72 (majority opinion) (“The question presented in this case is a 
narrow one, and we see no need to do more than answer that question in today’s decision.”). 
 114.  Id. at 173–74 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 115.  See id. at 175. 
 116.  Id. (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957)). 
 117.  See id. at 175–76. 
 118.  See id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The Court today holds simply and only that in 
cases under [FELA], railroad negligence and employee contributory negligence are governed by the 
same causation standard.”). 
 119.  Id. at 178. 
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required.120  Furthermore, she spent considerable time listing the policy 
considerations that supported finding that FELA contains a more relaxed 
proximate causation standard.121  Most prominent among these 
considerations was the legislative history expressing concern for the 
plight of injured rail workers and the difficulty of appropriately 
instructing juries as to the meaning and requirements of proximate 
cause.122  The two concurring opinions in Sorrell staked out opposing 
points of view regarding proximate cause under FELA, and McBride 
provided the Court with the necessary case in which to settle the dispute. 
D. McBride v. CSX Transportation, Inc. 
1. The Accident 
CSX employed plaintiff Robert McBride as a locomotive engineer 
from 1999 until 2004.123  In early 2004, McBride was assigned to a run 
on a train that was powered by five locomotives.124  The locomotive 
McBride was to operate utilized a dual braking system that required the 
engineer to operate an “independent brake” that the engineer controlled 
by hand and “actuated by pressing a button on the side of the brake 
handle.”125  Before the run, McBride approached his supervising 
engineer to express concerns about the safety of the train he would be 
operating and his lack of experience switching with an independent 
brake.126  The supervising engineer, however, instructed McBride to 
operate the train despite his concerns.127 
McBride complied with this request.128  During the eight hour run, 
McBride operated the independent brake “the whole time.”129  When 
McBride reached to grab the independent brake in anticipation of an 
upcoming stop toward the end of the run, his hand hit the brake handle, 
                                                          
 120.  See id. at 177–82 (discussing the limited nature of the Court’s holding while not setting 
forth an alternative standard of causation). 
 121.  Id. at 178–80. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598 F.3d 388, 389 (7th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2630 
(2011). 
 124.  Brief for Petitioner at 5, CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011) (No. 10-
235), 2011 WL 141225, at *5 [hereinafter Brief for CSX]. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  McBride, 598 F.3d at 390. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
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which caused significant pain and swelling.130  McBride described the 
pain as feeling “like somebody threw gas on my hand and set it afire.”131  
The injuries to McBride’s hand required two surgeries and physical 
therapy.132  As a result of his injuries, McBride sued CSX under FELA 
alleging that the repeated switching had fatigued his hand, thereby 
causing the injury.133 
2. Trial 
McBride asserted negligence on the theory that CSX was negligent 
in configuring the trains so that an engineer would be required to 
repeatedly use the actuator button on the independent brake for an 
extended period of time.134  Additionally, McBride alleged that CSX was 
negligent for failing to train him to operate the equipment.135  At trial, 
McBride and his expert witness both testified that their primary concern 
with the configuration of the trains was the increased risk of derailment 
or collision.136  Neither witness testified as to the foreseeability of 
McBride’s ultimate injury.137  The direct and foreseeable nature of 
McBride’s injury—typically required to satisfy common law proximate 
cause—was not at all clear from the evidence and testimony at trial.138 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the judge instructed the jury 
regarding McBride’s causation burden in accordance with the Seventh 
Circuit’s Pattern Instruction.139  The instruction stated in pertinent part 
that “Defendant ‘caused or contributed to’ Plaintiff’s injury if 
Defendant’s negligence played a part—no matter how small—in 
                                                          
 130.  Brief for CSX, supra note 124, at 5–6. 
 131.  McBride, 598 F.3d at 390. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Brief for CSX, supra note 124, at 6. 
 134.  McBride, 598 F.3d at 390. 
 135.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2635 (2011). 
 136.  See Brief for CSX, supra note 124, at 6. 
 137.  Id. at 6–7. 
 138.  See id. (describing McBride’s theory). 
 139.  See id. at 9–10.  The pattern instruction states in full:  
Defendant ‘caused or contributed to’ Plaintiff’s injury if Defendant’s negligence played a 
part—no matter how small—in bringing about the injury.  [There can be more than one 
cause contributing to an injury].  The mere fact that an injury occurred does not 
necessarily mean that the injury was caused by negligence.   
Fed. Civ. Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 9.02 (2009) (alteration in original), available at 
http://www.Ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf. 
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bringing about the injury.”140  CSX objected to this instruction, arguing 
that it unduly relaxed the proximate causation standard under FELA so 
as to render it nonexistent.141  CSX countered with its own causation 
instruction that read in pertinent part: “In order to establish that an injury 
was caused by the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff must show that (i) 
the injury resulted ‘in whole or in part’ from the defendant’s negligence, 
and (ii) the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the 
injury.”142  Even though CSX’s requested instruction included the 
statutory language from FELA, the trial court rejected the railroad’s 
proffered instruction and charged the jury in accordance with the Seventh 
Circuit’s model instruction.143  Relying on the pattern instruction 
regarding the applicable causation standard, the jury awarded McBride 
damages of $275,000, which the court reduced by 33% to account for the 
jury’s finding of McBride’s negligence.144  CSX moved for a new trial.145  
The trial court overruled CSX’s motion because “Plaintiff put forth 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Defendant was 
negligent and that such negligence caused Plaintiff’s injuries,”146 and 
CSX appealed.147 
3. CSX’s Appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
CSX appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, arguing that FELA required proof of proximate cause by the 
claiming party and that the trial court’s instruction failed to satisfy this 
requirement.148  The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, but in so 
doing, expressed a surprising amount of sympathy with CSX’s 
position.149  The opinion noted that the three-justice concurrence from 
Sorrell had “considerable force,”150 but it declined to accept the 
concurrence as an authoritative pronouncement on the muddled area of 
                                                          
 140.  McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 2010); Fed. Civ. Jury 
Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 9.02, supra note 139. 
 141.  See McBride, 598 F.3d at 391 (noting that CSX cited Sorrell in support of its position). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 06-CV-1017-JPG, 2008 WL 4185933, at *1 (S.D. Ill. 
Sept. 8, 2009). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  McBride, 598 F.3d at 389. 
 148.  See Brief for CSX, supra note 124, at 10. 
 149.  See id. 
 150.  McBride, 598 F.3d at 404. 
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law.151  Instead, because “the Supreme Court did not address, much less 
decide, the issue that CSX would have [the court of appeals] decide,”152 
the Seventh Circuit noted that “a circuit [court] must not anticipate future 
changes in jurisprudential course by the Supreme Court of the United 
States; it is the task of the circuit judge to apply established doctrine.”153  
Of additional concern to the appellate court was the impact that a 
reversal might have on how consistently FELA is applied in federal 
court.154  The court noted approvingly that the current causation standard 
under FELA accorded with all of the other federal circuits.155  In addition 
to exercising deference to Supreme Court precedent—although it was 
admittedly precedent of dubious reliability—the Seventh Circuit avoided 
creating a split in the law between circuits and affirmed the jury’s 
verdict, holding that the instruction that effectively eliminated a 
proximate cause element under FELA was correct.156  Accordingly, the 
appellate court found that “the jury instructions ‘correctly and 
completely informed the jury of the applicable law.’”157 
E. The Supreme Court’s Decision in McBride 
As it does with many landmark decisions, the Supreme Court 
announced the McBride decision only days before the end of the Court’s 
term in June 2011.158  Although the 5-4 decision split along mostly 
partisan lines, there was a noticeable deviation.159  Justice Thomas 
effectively cast the deciding vote in McBride by voting with Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan to affirm the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision.160  In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito in voting to reverse the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision and require a degree of proximate cause in actions under 
FELA.161  After voicing her opinion in Sorrell that FELA, as interpreted 
                                                          
 151.  Id. at 404–05. 
 152.  Id. at 404. 
 153.  Id. at 405 (quoting Nanda v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 312 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 
2002)). 
 154.  Id. at 405–06. 
 155.  Id. at 405. 
 156.  Id. at 405–06.  
 157.  Id. at 406 (quoting Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 158.  See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2630 (2011). 
 159.  Schwartz, supra note 84 (noting that majority included “conservative” Justice Thomas and 
“four far more liberal Justices”). 
 160.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2634. 
 161.  Id. at 2645 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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by Rogers, effectively eliminated a proximate cause requirement for 
injury,162 Justice Ginsburg’s vote in McBride was unsurprising.  With 
four colleagues accepting her position, Justice Ginsburg wrote the 
majority opinion in McBride that effectuated her earlier position for 
claims under FELA.163  Likewise, the votes of Justices Scalia and Alito 
were predictable given their agreement with Justice Souter’s concurrence 
in Sorrell.164 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Justice Ginsburg’s Majority Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in McBride was the culmination 
of her longstanding advocacy for liberalizing the causation requirements 
under FELA.  With the five votes necessary for a majority, Justice 
Ginsburg’s relaxed causation standard under FELA and Rogers became 
the authoritative interpretation of FELA, binding on both state and 
federal courts throughout the United States.165  The decision in McBride 
will have an enormous impact on common rail carrier liability in the 
United States.  To understand the extent of its impact, one must first 
understand Justice Ginsburg’s rationale.  The majority opinion relied 
primarily on Rogers as the “comprehensive statement”166 of FELA and 
the ordinary understanding of FELA’s causation language to arrive at the 
Court’s outcome.167  Beyond the regular canons of statutory 
interpretation, Justice Ginsburg also reopened her previous concerns 
expressed in Sorrell regarding the difficulty that juries have in applying 
proximate cause168 and the lack of any “absurd or untoward award[s]” 
under the challenged jury instruction.169  Despite Justice Ginsburg’s 
persuasive writing, the analysis in the majority opinion contains several 
errors that cast doubt on the efficacy of the decision. 
                                                          
 162.  See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 178–79 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(describing a “‘slightest’ cause” standard under FELA that is “far less exacting than ‘proximate’ 
cause”). 
 163.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2634. 
 164.  Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 165.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2634. 
 166.  Id. at 2638. 
 167.  See id. at 2643. 
 168.  Id. at 2641–43 (alternative opinion not joined by Thomas, J.). 
 169.  Id. at 2641. 
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1. Rogers Was Not an Authoritative Interpretation of Causation Under 
FELA 
The first mistake the Court made in its analysis in McBride was the 
almost cursory conclusion that “Rogers is most sensibly read as a 
comprehensive statement of the FELA causation standard.”170  On the 
contrary, Rogers should be understood in the context in which it was 
decided.  Justice Ginsburg’s declaration that it was a comprehensive 
statement of FELA’s causation standard was grounded primarily in broad 
dicta regarding Congress’s desire to provide enhanced protection to rail 
workers in enacting FELA.171  The majority opinion declares that “[o]ur 
subsequent decisions have confirmed that Rogers announced a general 
standard of causation in FELA cases.”172  This broad and consequential 
conclusion was not directly supported by a single citation of authority.  
The only case arguably supportive of this proposition was Ferguson v. 
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,173 decided the same day as Rogers.174  In 
Ferguson, the Court stated—in a plurality opinion—that the “any part 
test” announced in Rogers was applicable to cases regarding the 
foreseeability between negligence and an injury.175  Not only is reliance 
on one plurality opinion from the same Court that so badly mangled 
causation analysis under Rogers unpersuasive, but a fair reading of 
subsequent FELA cases that applied proximate causation standards 
should have compelled a different outcome in McBride.  The majority’s 
blindness to these competing precedents is somewhat surprising given 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s forceful explication of them in his 
dissent.176  Nevertheless, the Court’s reading of Rogers as announcing 
the authoritative causation standard for FELA was unpersuasive because 
of its extensive reliance on dicta and unwillingness to distinguish 
competing precedents. 
The facts in Rogers and subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court 
compel the conclusion that the majority’s interpretation of Rogers hinged 
on careless dicta included therein.  Although some lower federal courts 
                                                          
 170.  Id. at 2638. 
 171.  See id. at 2638–39. 
 172.  Id. at 2639. 
    173.    352 U.S. 521 (1957). 
 174.  Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 523–24). 
 175.  Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 523–24. 
 176.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2650 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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had relied on Rogers as being authoritative in this regard,177 the 
conclusion that Rogers interpreted FELA as abrogating common law 
conceptions of proximate cause is incorrect.  In fact, the jury instruction 
supplied by the court in Rogers used the term “proximate cause,”178 and 
the Court not only quoted that language but “took no issue with [it] in 
this respect.”179  Apparently, the Court had no problem reading a case 
that incorporated the term and concept of proximate cause as an 
authoritative pronouncement that the same case eliminated that concept’s 
relevance in analyzing claims under FELA.  This conclusion is further 
discredited by the numerous FELA cases—some pointed out by the 
dissent—that continued to use the phrase and concept of proximate 
cause,180 thereby disproving the Court’s claim that the matter was 
decided in Rogers.181 
The final omission in the Court’s interpretation of Rogers was the 
factual scenario that gave rise to that decision.  Although the majority 
portrayed Rogers as if stare decisis compelled the Court’s result because 
it dealt with precisely the same matter, the Court failed to admit that 
Rogers arose in the context of a dispute about the applicability of the 
doctrine of contributory negligence—not proximate cause.182  As Justice 
Souter noted in Sorrell, the Rogers decision did not substantively change 
the law as it related to proximate cause.183  Justice Ginsburg had not 
accepted this view when it was proffered by Justice Souter in Sorrell,184 
but because Rogers involved contributory negligence, it is fairly read as 
addressing only contributory negligence.  Instead, the Court latched onto 
the broad dicta in Rogers and erroneously concluded that it reached, and 
abrogated, proximate cause.  As Chief Justice Roberts rightly noted, 
Rogers only “clarified that, under a statute in which employer and 
employee could both be proximate causes of an injury, a railroad’s 
negligence need not be the sole or last cause in order to be proximate.”185  
                                                          
 177.  See id.  
 178.  Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 505 n.9 (1957). 
 179.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2649 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. 
Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 176 (2007) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 180.  In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts listed eight state courts of last resort that explicitly 
continued to use “proximate causation” as a relevant standard in FELA cases.  Id. at 2650.  
 181.  See id. at 2636 (majority opinion). 
 182.  See Rogers, 352 U.S. at 504 (rejecting the state court’s assertion that Rogers’s conduct 
“was the sole cause of his mishap”). 
 183.  See Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 174 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 184.  See id. at 177–78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 185.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2648 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Thus, the initial—and maybe dispositive—error in the Court’s analysis 
was its overbroad reading of Rogers.  Unfortunately, it was not the only 
error. 
2. The Emphasis on FELA’s Causation Language Ignores Relevant 
Parts of the Statute 
Justice Ginsburg relied on FELA’s language as a secondary point of 
emphasis in determining that common law proximate cause was no 
longer relevant in FELA cases.186  In emphasizing the statutory language 
as crucial to the Court’s outcome, however, the majority exposed a dire 
flaw in its analysis.  As a federal statutory tort, longstanding rules of 
interpretation compel the Court to start at the premise that Congress 
“adopt[ed] the background of general tort law.”187  Accordingly, the 
Court should have assumed that common law proximate causation 
standards were incorporated into FELA unless the language of the statute 
provided otherwise. 
The majority’s conclusion that the “in whole or in part” language 
abrogated common law proximate cause is erroneous on two levels.  
First, that language was apparently included to abrogate the common law 
doctrine of contributory negligence, which is what the Court actually 
held—although, admittedly, with a great lack of clarity—in Rogers.188  
Secondly, the statutory language in other parts of FELA explicitly 
abrogated common law elements that had previously prevented recovery 
to injured workers.189 
This makes the conclusion that Congress sought to eliminate 
proximate causation standards without doing so explicitly a dubious one, 
unsupported by a fair reading of the statute.  Instead of reading this much 
into congressional silence on the matter, the Court should have followed 
the standard rule of statutory interpretation whereby the Court will find 
proximate cause as an element of a statute even where it is not explicitly 
included.190  Instead, the majority broke the other way and concluded that 
Congress used the oblique “in whole or in part” language to abrogate a 
                                                          
 186.  See id. at 2636 (majority opinion). 
 187.  Id. at 2645 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 
1191 (2011)). 
 188.  Id. at 2647. 
 189.  Id. at 2646. 
 190.  See e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005) (requiring proof of 
proximate cause despite lack of explicit language in securities fraud statute). 
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foundational element of common law torts.191  The determination is an 
erroneous interpretation of the statutory language employed given that 
Congress had expressly abrogated other common law doctrines.  
Congress clearly knew how to eliminate common law elements of which 
it disapproved, and the drafters’ failure to do so with respect to 
proximate cause should have been dispositive in compelling the 
conclusion that proximate cause remained an element of FELA cases. 
3. The Majority Allowed Policy Goals to Outweigh Traditional 
Statutory Construction 
Policy considerations weighed heavily in the Court’s ultimate 
conclusion.  Specifically, a desire to see that the “‘humanitarian’ and 
‘remedial goal[s]’” of FELA192 were recognized and distaste for the 
concept of proximate cause were paramount in the Court’s decision.193  
Although these considerations may have a degree of relevance in 
deciding a case, the Court should not have allowed them to outweigh the 
history and text of the statute in arriving at its conclusion. 
While Congress sought to expand the potential for carrier liability in 
passing FELA, it does not follow that it dispensed with common law 
proximate cause.  The extralegal considerations for the plight of injured 
rail workers overly influenced the majority’s position, leading it to 
ignore precedent and competing policy considerations.  By reading an 
element of the federal tort out of the statute with scant legal support, the 
majority essentially adopted the position that the remedial and 
humanitarian goals of FELA should be pursued by any means necessary.  
While those goals have a limited degree of significance, the Court turned 
analysis of FELA on its head by concluding that a broad interpretation of 
the statute permitted—or even mandated—an erroneous legal conclusion.  
While some commentators have suggested FELA needs considerable 
change to cope with modern realities,194 any monumental changes—like 
eliminating a foundational element of a claim—should be left to 
Congress.  Regardless of the humanitarian goals the majority concluded 
Congress sought to pursue with FELA, Congress provided a template for 
                                                          
 191.  See McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2644 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is not error in a FELA case to 
refuse a charge embracing stock proximate cause terminology.”). 
 192.  Id. at 2636 (alteration in original) (quoting Consol. R.R. Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 
542–43 (1994)). 
 193.  See id. at 2637 (criticizing use of the term “proximate cause” as shorthand for a concept). 
 194.  See, e.g., Amato, supra note 3, at 132–36. 
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those goals in the statute.  The Court’s majority ignored that template in 
large part based on policy considerations it believed Congress intended 
with FELA. 
The majority’s criticism of proximate cause as a legal concept also 
appeared to heavily influence the outcome in McBride.  As Chief Justice 
Roberts noted, “[t]he plurality breaks no new ground in criticizing the 
variety of formulations of the concept of proximate cause.”195  Justice 
Ginsburg’s scathing and mostly accurate criticism of proximate cause 
was misplaced.  Proximate cause is admittedly a “deep and muddy water 
into which many men, wise and otherwise have ventured,”196 but for 
better or worse, it is the legal concept governing causation that has 
existed at common law for generations.197  It should not be done away 
with in an entire area of the law on the whim of five Justices.198  The 
academic merits of proximate cause are legitimate topics for scholarly 
debate, and perhaps eventually lawmakers—as opposed to judges—will 
follow their lead.  In the meantime, however, judges should not allow 
their opinion of a certain longstanding legal concept to effectively 
overturn a well-established body of law. 
B. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in McBride is more consistent with 
Rogers and follows Congress’s intent in passing FELA more clearly than 
the majority’s opinion.199  His dissent would have required that a 
proximate causation standard be included as an essential element in 
FELA cases.200  This position is supported primarily by two lines of 
reasoning.  First, Chief Justice Roberts argues that proximate cause had 
always been considered an essential element of FELA claims, and 
without congressional action or judicial precedent to the contrary, it was 
inappropriate for the Court to eliminate this requirement.201  
Accordingly, the dissent criticizes the majority opinion’s willingness to 
read Rogers as broad enough to compel the elimination of proximate 
                                                          
 195.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2645 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 196.  VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 303 n.1 (12th ed. 
2010) (quoting White v. S. Ry. Co., 144 S.E. 424, 429 (Va. 1928)). 
 197.  See McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2645 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 198.  The section of the opinion dealing with proximate cause only garnered four votes, thus 
limiting its effectiveness as precedent.  Id. at 2642–43 (alternate opinion not joined by Thomas, J.). 
 199.  See id. at 2644–52 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 200.  See id. at 2645.  
 201.  See id. at 2647–50. 
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cause.202  In a similar vein, Chief Justice Roberts dismisses Justice 
Ginsburg’s argument that the matter was settled and proximate cause was 
not a foundational requirement in FELA actions.203  Although he 
concedes that most federal courts applied a significantly relaxed 
causation standard following Rogers, the dissent lists a multitude of 
states whose court of last resort explicitly required proximate cause.204  
The dissent concludes by briefly responding to Justice Ginsburg’s policy 
concerns.205  Chief Justice Roberts expresses the concern that—although 
proximate cause is not a perfect gauge—it is “the vocabulary for 
answering such questions [of fault]” under FELA, and without it, 
potential defendants will be left to answer for injuries of a completely 
unforeseeable nature.206 
Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in McBride closely 
followed Justice Souter’s concurrence in Sorrell, which Roberts refused 
to join.  If Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy—who joined 
Roberts in dissent—had joined Justices Souter, Scalia, and Alito in 
Sorrell, there would have been a five-justice majority to authoritatively 
establish that proximate cause was still required under FELA.  Instead, 
with the retirement of Justice Souter in 2009, Justice Sotomayor joined 
the Court and became the fifth and decisive vote when the issue of 
proximate cause reached the Court in McBride.  This will have profound 
consequences for railroad liability under FELA because, as described 
below, the Court’s decision in McBride will significantly increase the 
potential for carrier liability.207  Although Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent 
persuasively set forth this conclusion, the lack of a fifth vote for that 
position throws the carriers subject to FELA’s causation standard on the 
mercy of Congress.208 
At oral argument, Justice Scalia asked McBride’s attorney to 
describe the proximate causation standard he would have the Court apply 
in FELA cases.209  Although McBride’s counsel responded by advocating 
a “but-for plus” standard of legal causation, the dissent notes that the 
                                                          
 202.  See id. at 2648. 
 203.  Id. at 2650–51. 
 204.  Id. at 2650. 
 205.  Id. at 2651–52. 
 206.  Id. at 2652. 
 207.  See infra Part III.C. 
 208.  See infra Part III.E. 
 209.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011) (No. 10-235), 
http://supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-235.pdf. 
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Court’s opinion simply adopted a “but for” causation standard.210  Justice 
Scalia displayed his inclination to side with CSX by posing a series of 
hypothetical queries that would remind any lawyer of her first-year torts 
course.211  Chief Justice Roberts followed up Scalia’s hypothetical 
scenarios—which included snake bites and lightning strikes—by arguing 
that the Court’s new standard is simply no standard, or in other words: 
“Caelum terminus est—the sky’s the limit.”212 
C. The Threat of Unlimited Liability for Carriers Under McBride’s 
Standard 
1. McBride Will Encourage a Flood of New FELA Claims 
The standard McBride effectuated will subject common rail carriers 
to the potential for nearly unlimited liability.  If this prospect comes to 
fruition, it will not only have disastrous consequences for railroads—
economically, practically, and for their publicity—but the negative 
effects of subjecting a strong American industry to potentially enormous 
monetary liability will negatively impact the rest of the economy and 
American society.  In response to this concern, Justice Ginsburg noted 
that the current standard is effectively the same one that has been applied 
in federal and most state courts since Rogers.213  The majority opinion 
noted that under this relaxed standard of causation, there are still 
adequate limits that prevent the railroads from being subjected to an 
undue or overly burdensome amount of litigation.214  The limitations 
cited by Ginsburg, however, were “common sense [and] FELA’s 
limitations on who may sue . . . and for what [they may sue].”215  
Moreover, the Court opined that the effect of the decision, if any, was to 
allow juries to make a more accurate finding of liability or no liability 
under FELA.216 
Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s assurance, however, “but for” liability 
under FELA will impose costs on common carriers.217  This lax liability 
                                                          
 210.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2647 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 211.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 209, at 30–31. 
 212.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2652. 
 213.  Id. at 2640 (majority opinion). 
 214.  Id. at 2644. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  See id. (discussing the negative consequences of adopting the charge to the jury sought by 
CSX, including the potential to mislead the jury). 
 217.  Id. at 2645 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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standard will encourage the plaintiff’s bar to innovate new and inventive 
claims.  For years, many litigants have tried to make claims for illnesses 
and conditions that have little or no obvious tie to their time as a railroad 
employee.218  While these claims have, for the most part, failed to gain 
traction,219 the explicit rejection of a common law understanding of 
proximate cause will encourage a new deluge of claims of dubious 
viability under prior law.  Regardless of the majority’s assurances that 
common sense and statutory limits will prevent litigants from bringing 
these claims,220 these limits will matter little when employees need only 
demonstrate an injury with the most tenuous link to the alleged 
negligence of their employer.  For two primary reasons, McBride all but 
guarantees that American railroads will suffer a significant increase in 
liability and actionable claims under FELA. 
The first reason potential liability under FELA will increase after 
McBride—an authoritative pronouncement on a federal question—is that 
the decision will now govern all FELA cases in every jurisdiction.  
Although the majority rightly pointed out that federal courts and the 
majority of state courts already applied a standard similar to—though 
less explicit than—that which will be instituted by McBride,221 
jurisdictions that have previously concluded that proximate cause is an 
essential limitation on recovery under FELA may no longer require that 
element.  Jurisdictions that had maintained the proximate cause 
requirement222 had good reasons for doing so, but after McBride these 
legal, economic, and policy considerations are no longer relevant.  As 
explained below, allowing jurisdictions to formulate their own 
instructions and specific standards within a flexible proximate causation 
framework best comports with FELA’s language and a common sense 
approach to tort law in a federal system.223 
                                                          
 218.  See, e.g., Carlisle v. Consol. Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering a 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from work-related stress), rev’d sub nom. 
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). 
 219.  See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 554 (1994) (rejecting the Third 
Circuit’s approach in Carlisle that allowed a claim for “the stresses and strains of everyday 
employment”). 
 220.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2641 (majority opinion). 
 221.  Id. at 2640. 
 222.  See, e.g., Ballard v. Union Pac. R. Co., 781 N.W.2d 47 (Neb. 2010) (“This court has stated 
that to recover under FELA, an employee must prove . . . that the alleged negligence is a proximate 
cause of the employee’s injury.”). 
 223.  See infra Part III.D. 
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McBride sounded the death knell for an effective proximate cause 
limitation in FELA cases.  Particularly because—like many personal 
injury and negligence claims—many FELA cases are prosecuted under 
contingency fee arrangements,224 the elimination of a proximate cause 
requirement means that plaintiffs’ lawyers will be more likely to take on 
cases that were previously much less likely to succeed.  Justice Ginsburg 
cited several examples where the common sense of judges presiding over 
FELA cases prevented the most outrageous claims of a connection 
between employer negligence and injury from reaching the jury.225  What 
these examples fail to account for, however, are the significant burdens 
that defending frivolous claims place on railroads in terms of efficiency, 
time, and money.  With an explicit charge from the Supreme Court that 
an injury is recoverable when it has only the most tenuous connection to 
alleged employer negligence, strike suits and questionable claims are 
nearly certain to result.  The impacted railroads, moreover, will be 
likelier than ever to settle these claims for fear of allowing a jury to hear 
evidence and be instructed that the slightest relationship between 
negligence and injury will suffice.  The Court’s reassurances about the 
statutory limits on claims and the common sense of judges preventing 
this seemingly obvious outcome should be of little solace to railroads and 
the attorneys engaged to represent them. 
2. The New Claims Will Have an Enormous Economic Impact on 
Carriers and the Industry 
McBride has the potential to significantly harm the railroad industry.  
Particularly in a time of economic uncertainty, introducing a radically 
expanded potential for liability into one of America’s most important 
industries is dangerous.  The unemployment rate in the United States 
currently hovers around 8%.226  The railroad industry is one of America’s 
most important employment engines.227  The threat is real that the 
                                                          
 224.  See Daniel Saphire, FELA and Rail Safety: A Response to Babcock and Oldfather—The 
Role of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in Railroad Safety, 19 TRANSP. L. J. 401, 411 n.46 
(1991) (implying that actions under FELA are primarily financed through contingency fee 
arrangements).  
 225.  See McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2643–44 (majority opinion). 
 226.  Economic News Release, Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment 
Situation News Release (Oct. 5, 2012), http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit 
_10052012.htm. 
 227.  See Chris Bury, Railroads Adding 15,000 New U.S. Jobs, ABC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011, 3:12 
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2011/10/railroads-adding-15000-new-u-s-jobs/.  
BYQUIST FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  1:04 PM 
2012] DERAILING FELA’S CAUSATION STANDARD 587 
increased likelihood of liability for entirely unforeseeable accidents and 
the need to settle strike lawsuits because of McBride’s new permissive 
legal standard will significantly decrease the employment capacity of the 
rail industry.  The railroads are already entities that Americans—
including billionaire investor Warren Buffett228—look to for economic 
stability in times of turmoil.  The railroad industry is well suited to 
provide this stability because of its established role in the American 
economy, the inability to shift rail jobs overseas, and the continuing 
necessity to transport people and goods within an advanced economy.  
Imposing legally dubious, and economically disastrous, liability on the 
railroad industry will inevitably cause considerable harm to the very 
economy for which the industry would otherwise provide stability. 
D. A More Appropriate Standard of Causation Under FELA 
The Court in McBride called the proximate causation standard from 
Rogers a settled matter.229  As the dissent pointed out, however, the issue 
of the causation standard under FELA as interpreted by the Rogers Court 
was anything but clear.230  Thus, what causation standard Congress 
intended was a disputed issue—one that necessitated the Supreme 
Court’s review in McBride.231  Instead of the standard announced in 
McBride, a more appropriate causation standard should be formulated for 
cases under FELA.  FELA’s causation language requires a successful 
claimant to establish proximate cause.232  Within this proximate 
causation construct, a standard should be articulated that allows for 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction flexibility.  Such legislation would permit 
each jurisdiction to decide along a continuum the necessary proof of 
causation for recovery, but it would also protect the railroads from “but 
for” causation liability—the very type of liability that poses a severe 
threat to the economic well-being of the rail industry in the wake of 
McBride. 
                                                          
 228.  Buffet Buying Burlington Northern Railroad, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 3, 2009, 3:16 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33599744/ns/business-us_business/t/buffett-buying-burlington-
northern-railroad/. 
 229.  McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2640. 
 230.  See id. at 2650 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that several states have rejected the 
notion that proximate cause should be “relegate[d] . . . to the dustbin” in FELA cases). 
 231.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 49, at 5 (discussing the case’s statutory 
background). 
 232.  See supra Part III.A–B. 
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E. Congressional Action is Necessary to Amend FELA’s Causation 
Language 
In large part due to the inability to move past partisan gridlock, 
Congress’s approval ratings have sunk near all-time lows.233  Although 
the political parties are seemingly unable to agree on anything, codifying 
the standard articulated above234—thus repudiating the Supreme Court’s 
decision in McBride—is a legislative goal that should be politically 
acceptable to both parties.  Congress should overturn the Court’s 
decision with a law clarifying its intent, passed by simple majorities and 
signed into law by the President.  A flexible causation standard that 
incorporates proximate cause will not only correct the uncertainties 
remaining after McBride, but will also improve rail policy in terms of 
efficiency and fairness.  Because of the economic impact that the post-
McBride causation standard under FELA will wreak on common rail 
carriers,235 members of Congress in both political parties should quickly 
act to clarify that proximate cause is a requirement for a successful claim 
under FELA. 
Congress has a long history of legislating on issues that directly 
impact the railroad industry.  These laws have been both for the benefit 
of the railroads and, like FELA, for the regulation of the industry.  After 
McBride, congressional policy regarding the railroad industry has been 
distorted beyond recognition.  Although Congress has repeatedly rejected 
calls to repeal FELA and create a workers’ compensation-like scheme 
that compensates injured workers on a no-fault basis,236 lawmakers have 
repeatedly decided to maintain the current regime for recovery that is 
based on negligence and fault.237  The Court’s decision in McBride treads 
dangerously close to entirely supplanting Congress’s preferred policy of 
fault-based liability in favor of a no-fault—or at least no-cause—regime 
that does not have any limits on recovery.  Although the majority argued 
that congressional silence following Rogers should be understood as 
                                                          
 233.  See Congressional Job Approval, REAL CLEAR POLITICS, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ 
epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-903.html) (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (indicating that 13.8% 
of Americans approved of Congress as of Oct. 7, 2012). 
 234.  See supra Part III.D. 
 235.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 236.  See Brief for Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 16–17, CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011) (No. 10-235), 2011 WL 719641, at 
*16–17. 
 237.  See McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2646 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that Congress expressly 
eliminated certain common law doctrines in FELA while leaving proximate cause in place). 
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acquiescence in the elimination of a meaningful proximate causation 
standard,238 the unsettled, inconsistent, and disputed meaning of FELA 
following Rogers should not be read so broadly.  In the wake of 
McBride, however, it is imperative that Congress clarify its intent that 
liability in common rail carrier accidents be assigned only on the basis of 
fault and causation.  By allowing McBride to stand, Congress has 
effectively permitted the judiciary to read the proximate causation 
standard out of the statute.  In eliminating a meaningful causation 
standard, the Court has moved FELA in the very direction of no-fault 
liability that Congress has repeatedly rejected.  Acquiescing in this shift 
is tantamount to deferring lawmaking authority regarding accidents in 
the railroad industry to unelected judges. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To ensure that railroads can continue to capture America’s 
imagination while also fueling her economic growth, it is essential that 
common rail carriers not be subjected to “but for” liability due to a 
misinterpretation of an early-twentieth-century statute.  Because the 
Supreme Court’s erroneous decision in McBride will do just that, 
Congress must act to emphatically declare its intent that FELA include a 
proximate causation standard in accord with common law norms.  The 
majority in McBride misinterpreted FELA’s statutory language and 
Rogers’s impact on its meaning.  The dissent in McBride persuasively 
rebutted the majority’s opinion and pointed out its most obvious 
shortcomings.  But the dissent did not articulate an alternative standard 
for proximate cause, and Congress should act to reverse the majority’s 
decision by clarifying that FELA does contain a proximate cause 
requirement.  The amendment should also specify that the “new” 
proximate causation standard is one that should be applied flexibly on a 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis and in accordance with each 
jurisdiction’s policy determinations and necessities.  In so doing, 
Congress will ensure that one of its first and most successful 
employment safety statutes continues to successfully protect railroad 
employees without subjecting rail carriers to an unbearable level of 
liability.  This task can be easily accomplished, and it will allow the 
railroad industry and its workers to chug forth in the Twenty-First 
Century. 
                                                          
 238.  See id. at 2640 (majority opinion). 
